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Abstract. Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is one of the most influ-
ential theories of consciousness, mainly due to its claim of mathematically
formalizing consciousness in a measurable way. However, the theory, as
it is formulated, does not account for contextual observations that are
crucial for understanding consciousness. Here we put forth three possi-
ble difficulties for its current version, which could be interpreted as a
trilemma. Either consciousness is contextual or not. If contextual, either
IIT needs revisions to its axioms to include contextuality, or it is incon-
sistent. If consciousness is not contextual, then IIT faces an empirical
challenge. Therefore, we argue that IIT in its current version is inade-
quate.
Key words: consciousness, contextuality, integrated information the-
ory
1 Introduction
The Integrated Information Theory (IIT), developed by Giulio Tononi in a series
of influential papers, promises to deliver not only an account of consciousness
but also a concrete way to measure it [20,25]. In this paper, we focus on the
second aspect of IIT. We shall argue that there are potential problems that
require clarification concerning a tension between IIT’s mathematical model of
consciousness and contemporary models of contextuality.
Contextuality is important to measure consciousness for several reasons. Here
we mention three salient ones. As IIT makes clear, the integration of semantic
content is fundamental for understanding consciousness. IIT is so explicit about
this semantic integration that it provides a set of definitions regarding not only
conceptual content, but also how conceptual content is integrated into maximally
specific experiences. But conscious content is always determined at a context of
informational background, which is cognitive and perceptual, with many vari-
ables that need to be determined at any moment in time. This is one of the main
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reasons why contextuality is central in linguistics and pragmatics—content de-
pends on context and background assumptions.
A second reason to assume contextuality as a constraint on theories (and
more pressingly measurements) of consciousness concerns attention. Attention,
like conversational content, depends on background conditions and relevance.
It also depends on conceptual content and is guided by many neural processes
associated with voluntary and involuntary attention [19]. Context, therefore, is
not only environmentally driven, but also motivationally determined.
Finally, a very important reason to take contextuality seriously into account
in a theory of consciousness is the very nature of measurements. Measurements
are notoriously contextual, a fact made quite vivid not only by quantum mechan-
ics, but also by psychology and linguistics, disciplines who occupy a central role
in studies about consciousness [3,17,6]. Thus, the contextuality of measurements
is central to one of the main goals of IIT: to provide a measure for consciousness.
Our main argument is that IIT is empirically problematic, based on formal
considerations concerning contextuality. One possibility is that IIT is problem-
atic because, in its current formulation, it is incompatible with our current un-
derstandings of how to accommodate mathematically content that is contextual
due to limited access to all processes. This would mean that IIT is in principle
plausible, but in practice impossible to test. Alternatively, it could be that IIT
is incomplete and needs critical amendments. This would mean that the theory
could be compatible with our current understanding of contextuality but that it
is unclear how it could be compatible with it. In either case, we believe that IIT
is empirically problematic as it stands now, and that clarification is needed.
A more troublesome possibility, for which we will not argue as decisively as
the previous empirical one, is that, in its current version, IIT is in principle in-
compatible with mathematical approaches to contextuality. Given the centrality
of contextuality in understanding consciousness, this would make IIT internally
inconsistent. This would mean that IIT needs to be abandoned. We will not de-
velop this criticism and will only focus on the empirical one, but we mention this
problem because we believe this is also an issue that demands further clarity,
namely, it needs to be demonstrated that if IIT turns out to be incomplete, that
it is at least in principle compatible with contextual data.
Before proceeding, two crucial clarifications are needed. First, our criticism
is based on considerations concerning a notion of contextuality susceptible to
mathematical analysis. IIT explicitly demands a mathematical treatment of the
Φmeasure and, as we will explain, this demand entails a mathematical treatment
of contextuality. Our criticism only targets this formal, but still crucial, aspect
of IIT. Because of our focus, whatever metaphysical commitments IIT has, for
instance regarding panpsychism (or dualistic and monistic interpretations), are
beyond the scope of this paper. Second, the notion of contextuality we work with
here is relevant to linguistics, but we are not appealing to all cases of context
sensitivity in linguistics. Rather, we use only a restricted sense of contextuality
that can be formalized in terms of violations to sums of probabilities. Thus, we do
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not address forms of context dependence in pragmatics and forms of implicature
in general.
To put forth our argument, we organize this paper in the following way. First,
in Section 2 we discuss the current understanding of the mathematical theory of
contextuality. Then, in Section 3, we present discussions of contextuality in IIT,
and put forth our main argument. We end with some comments and discussions
in Section 4.
2 Contextuality
Contextuality is an important concept in many different fields, such as in linguis-
tics, physics and psychology. For that reason, there are many different definitions
of contextuality, but here we focus on a mathematically precise definition that
is relevant to IIT, as it directly relates to theories of measurement. Intuitively,
contextuality is the idea that a quantity (say, the truth value of a proposition)
depends on the overall environment in which it is present. To formalize such
idea, the concept of random variables is used.
First, let us start with probabilities. The most straightforward way to define
probabilities is axiomatic [18]. Accordingly, a probability space (Ω,F , p), where
Ω is a a set of possible elementary events (the sample space), F an algebra (of
events) over Ω, and p a function p : F → [0, 1], is a triple satisfying:
1. p(Ω) = 1
2. p(
⋃
iAi) =
∑
iAi, for i 6= j and Ai ∩Aj = ∅.
In this definition, p (A) is the probability of event A happening.
A random variable R is a (measurable) function R : F → E, where E is
a set of real numbers. The idea of a random variable is to model the stochas-
tic properties of the outcomes of a given experiment, where e ∈ E corresponds
to possible values of such outcomes. For example, imagine a hypothetical ex-
periment measuring participants heights, with the minimum measurable height
being 110 cm and the maximum 210 cm, with a resolution of 1 cm, the set
of possible outcomes of measurements is E = {110, 111, 112, . . . , 209, 210}. If
we randomly select participants, the outcomes of their height measurement will
follow some distribution (perhaps two superposed and truncated Gaussians, cor-
responding to female and male participants). A random variable modeling the
height-measuring experiment should have all the same stochastic characteristics
of it, and the random sampling of elements of Ω corresponds, intuitively, to the
random sampling of participants and their respective heights.
The range of values of a random variable can be set to match that of any type
of measurement, but the simplest ones are yes-no questions (e.g., “is this person
taller than 170 cm?”). For such cases, two-valued random variables may be used
to correspond to answers to the question “does the object/system have property
P?”. For example, E may be chosen as being either−1 (for “no”) or 1 (for “yes”). If
the the property P is measured, then we record 1, and if it does not, we record−1.
Since this is modeled with the random variableR : F → {−1, 1} on a probability
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space (Ω,F , p), we can think about the two-valued random variables as truth-
values for propositions about the system, and the algebra F as corresponding
to logical statements about such propositions (e.g. for two distinct elements
A1, A2 ∈ F , A1 ∪ A2 and A1 ∩ A2 are also in F , and correspond to the logical
connectives “or” and “and,” respectively). In other words, random variables (and
their corresponding probabilistic measures) correspond to a natural (stochastic)
extension of logical statements about the nature of experimental outcomes. The
logical structure of the statements come from the underlying Boolean algebraic
structure that is derived from the ordering provided by the probability function
p over the algebra F .
So, how does contextuality come about in the language of random variables?
As mentioned above, a system is contextual if it varies from one context to
another. But what do we mean by “vary,” and what do we mean by “context?”
Let us start with an example, which will be useful below. Imagine we have a
set of N properties (or concepts), denoted by Pi, i = 1, . . . , N . The simplest
contextual example could be though of as coming from N = 2, as in what
happens with order effects. For example, consider the following two questions
reflecting participants beliefs, discussed by [26,27]: P1 = “Do you generally think
Bill Clinton is honest and trustworthy?”; P2 = “Do you generally think Al Gore
is honest and trustworthy?” Since those are two separate questions, they must
be asked sequentially. We have only two possible ways to ask those questions:
first P1 and then P2 or first P2 and then P1. It so happens that when doing
so, the probabilities for Pi change. For instance, in a 1997 Gallup pool [26,27],
respondents answered yes to P1 at a rate of 50% when P1 was first, and 57%
when P1 was asked after P2. Similarly, P2 got a rate of 68% when first, and 60%
when after P1. This clearly shows an order effect, but more importantly, in a
certain sense Clinton was considered by respondents as more trustworthy in the
context of his relation with Al Gore than not, whereas Gore lost some of his
trustworthiness when associated to Clinton.
In terms of random variables, if we think of P1 and P2 as representing those
questions, then we have changes in the expectations of those random variables
according to their order (or context). This is a situation where we have direct
influences of one variable (which may also establish context) onto another. For
example, in our Clinton/Gore example, we can think of the question P1 (or P2)
directly influencing the respondent’s belief about the following question: Gore
gives Clinton a honesty bump. We call this explicit contextuality4.
A more subtle case occurs when the random variables are not inconsistently
connected. To see this, let us examine N = 3, and also that the properties are
“yes” or “no.” This is described by ±1-valued random variables, P1, P2, and
P3, whose expectations are all equal to zero, meaning that we have equally
random chances to either get +1 or −1 as outcomes of measurements of those
variables. This case is more interesting because, as constructed, we do not allow
for the type of explicit contextuality discussed in the paragraph above. Vari-
4 This term was introduced by Pawel Kurzynski. See his contribution to this confer-
ence.
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ables P1, P2, and P3 may be correlated: their pairwise joint expectations (e.g.
E (P1P2)) can take values between -1 and 1, corresponding to anti-correlated
and perfectly correlated (with 0 meaning that they have no correlation)5. Imag-
ine furthermore that experimental conditions are such that we can never ob-
serve all three random variables together, but only in pairs. It is possible to
imagine an experimental setup that the measured correlations, given the im-
possibility of simultaneous observations of all three variables, be, for example,
E (P1P2) = E (P1P3) = E (P3P2) = −1 (for a concrete example, see [5]). It
is easy to see that there is a problem with the −1 correlations. For example,
if P1 = 1, the first correlation implies P2 = −1, and the third implies that
P3 = 1, which in turn, from the second correlation, implies P1 = −1, a clear
contradiction. What is leading to the contradiction is the assumption that the
variable P1 in the context of the experiment measuring (P1,P2) is the same as
the P1 in the context (P1,P2)6. If we were to, for example, index the variables
(as proposed by Dzhafarov and Kujala [9,10]7) according to their context, such
contradictions would not appear.8
The above example shows how contextuality might be manifest as the impos-
sibility of assigning the same values to a quantity in a way that is independent
of the context. However, as it is presented, it comes from a logical contradiction.
So, the question remains as to how one can extend the criteria for stochastic
systems. A way to see this comes from the work of Abramsky and Hardy, where
they showed that violations of logical consistency such as the one above are
necessary and sufficient conditions the non-existence of a joint probability dis-
tribution (jpd) [1]. In other words, even when we have probabilistic outcomes,
the existence of a single probability space (Ω,F , p) is a necessary and suffi-
cient condition for no logical inconsistencies, and therefore no contextuality. As
a consequence, for the example of three variables, it can be shown [24] that the
variables are not contextual iff
−1 ≤ E (P1P2) + E (P1P3) + E (P2P3) (1)
≤ 1 + 2min {E (P1P2) , E (P1P3) , E (P2P3)} .
The logical violation is a more subtle example of contextuality than the first
one examined, where the statistical properties of a quantity changed with con-
text. To distinguish the two types of contextuality above, one that is manifest
5 Because of our choice of ±1-valued random variables with zero expectation, their
joint expectations coincide with their correlations.
6 This example is examined in detail in Specker’s Parable of the Over-Zealous Seer
[cite], but was also discussed much earlier on by Boole [cite].
7 The indexing idea is also related to Stalnaker’s two-dimensional semantics; see [23].
8 In the works of Dzhafarov and Kujala, when we can assign contextuality because of
direct influences between the measuring conditions of random variables, such vari-
ables are said to be inconsistently connected [10,14,8,12,11]. To those author’s, a
system is contextual only if all context effects are not explainable by direct influ-
ences. So, for them the P1, P2, and P3 perfectly anti-correlated example is con-
textual, whereas the Clinton/Gore one is not. However, we emphasize that this is a
nomenclature issue.
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in the changed expectations from one context to another, and the other that is
a consequence of the impossibility of attaching a consistent underlying logical
structure via a jpd, we refer to systems that exhibit the former as exhibiting
explicit contextuality or being explicitly contextual (or, according to [13], incon-
sistently connected systems) and the latter as exhibiting hidden contextuality or
being implicitly contextual.
The example above can be generalized to more than three random variables,
as well as to random variables that take multiple values. To represent this in
terms of random variables in a way that makes the context explicit, we can use
a contextual index in the following way. We start with the assumption that each
experiment and its corresponding variables correspond to a context. We think of
the random variables as contextual when we cannot associated to a variable Pi
in one context the same probability space as the Pi in another context (i.e., there
is no single jpd that describe Pi in all contexts). For our three random variable
example above, only pairs are observable, namely (P1, P2), (P1, P3), or (P2, P3),
but never triples, e.g. (P1, P2, P3). Let us call C1 the experimental condition (or
context) (P1, P2), C2 condition (P1, P3), and C3 condition (P2, P3). To represent
this explicitly in our notation, we add an index for context. For example, P1,1 is
P1 in context C1, whereas P1,2 is P1 in context C2, and so on.
With this notation in mind, inconsistently connected systems are those in
which it is not true that P1,1 ∼ P1,2, where this notation means “the random
variable P1,1 has the same distribution as P1,2.” As an example, let us revisit
the Cliton-Gore order-effect survey, where two questions are asked in sequence
in two different orders, C1 and C2:
C1: P1,1 = “Is Bill Clinton trustworthy?”; P2,1 = “Is Al Gore trustworthy?”;
C2: P2,2 = “Is Al Gore trustworthy?”; P1,2 = “Is Bill Clinton trustworthy?”.
It may be somewhat surprising that the expected answer to P1,1, denoted by
E(P1,1) and given by
E(P1,1) =
∑
ωi∈Ω
p (ωi)P1,1 (ωi)
= p (P1,1 = 1)− p (P1,1 = −1) ,
is more positive toward Bill Clinton than P1,2, but that is what was shown
empirically [22] (i.e., E(P1,1) > E(P1,2)). However, we should point out that
mathematically, because we are using contextual indexing, it is not problematic
to have different expectations for each context, whereas in the example with no
contextual indexing, we would have a seemingly direct contradiction (P1  P1).
In the hidden contextuality case with three random variables, the indexed
notation can also be extended. As before, imagine the extreme case where
E(P1,1P2,1) = E(P1,2P3,2) = E(P2,3P3,3) = −1. If we do not assume that
the observed property is independent of context, we run into no problems. How-
ever, if we set Pi,j = Pi,j′ , we run into the same type of problems as before, and
reach a contradiction.
Contextuality in the Integrated Information Theory 7
At this point it is worthwhile to discuss some aspects of contextuality that
are directly relevant to our argument. Contextuality only exists when we cannot
observe all quantities of interest simultaneously: measuring all random variables
at the same time implies the existence of a jpd by simply creating a data ta-
ble that can be used to compute the jpd and the relative frequencies for each
marginal distribution. However, it is often the case that the random variables
cannot be all measured simultaneously. This lack of simultaneous measurement
may have two different origins: (i) it may be impossible in principle to measure
P1,P2, . . . ,PN simultaneously, or (ii) it may be empirically difficult, perhaps
even impossible in practice.
For (i), there can be situations, particularly when the system is contextual
by direct influences, where the observation of P1 precedes temporally and af-
fects directly P2; this seems to be the case for the example of the Gore/Clinton
questionnaire discussed above. One cannot ask a question about Al Gore’s trust-
worthiness simultaneously with a question about Clinton; they must be asked
in order. The same is the case for contextual examples in quantum mechanics,
where there is no jpd. In entangled quantum systems, there are no direct influ-
ences, but we cannot measure non-commuting observables simultaneously, and
depending on the choice of observables, no jpd exists [15].
For (ii), the situation is slightly different. There may not be a principled
reason for not observing all three random variables simultaneously, but experi-
mental design or measurement constraints may create a de facto impossibility of
observing them. This was, for instance, the case of the contextual firefly intro-
duced by Foulis (see [5] for an explicit contextual model). Because experimental
constraints or technical limitations prevent us from observing all variables at
the same time, the correlations between them may be enhanced, such that by
this process the observations cannot fit a jpd. In other words, the marginal ex-
pectations of correlations change from context to context, in a way similar to
explicit contextuality. Furthermore, it might be possible that when we observe a
system, we may be unaware of the random variables being contextual, which is
something that we only verify empirically. For instance, there is nothing strange
about observing correlations E (P1P2) = E (P1P3) = E (P3P2) = −1. It is not
until we put all three together, in an attempt to obtain a jpd, that we realize
their inconsistency. That no jpd exists in certain circumstances is nontrivial for
the three-random-variable example, and it becomes even more difficult to estab-
lish for more variables (consistency is checked with the satisfaction of inequalities
whose complexities increase rapidly with the number of involved variables).
Contextuality shows up in many situations, from quantum mechanics to so-
cial sciences (see [17,16,6] and references therein). In particular, well-known ex-
amples exist in cognitive sciences, where human decision making has been shown
to not follow classical probability theory, being therefore either explicitly or im-
plicitly contextual (though recent work suggests that in psychology all examples
are explicitly contextual [7]). Furthermore, the connection between speech and
thought is well know to be contextual, with many examples discussed in the
literature. Thus, a discussion of contextuality as it refers to proposed theories
8 JA de Barros, C Montemayor & LP Guimarães de Assis
of consciousness is not only relevant, but essential. In the next section, we will
turn our attention to one such theory, the Integrated Information Theory (IIT)
[20].
3 Contextuality in IIT
It is unclear whether the measurable human mind (thought here to be equivalent
to the brain and its physical states) is contextual in principle. It is not unimag-
inable (in fact, many theories do so) that, for example, quantum processes are
important in the brain. If this is the case, it is possible (though we believe im-
probable, mainly due to decoherence) that entanglement of relevant neuronal
processes exist. Such entanglement may produce contextual random variables,
and would preclude the existence of a jpd.
Though the previous argument could be made that the brain is contextual,
at the microlevel, we want to focus on the difficulties mentioned in Section 2.
First, why should we bother with contextuality, at least from an empirical point
of view, when thinking about the brain. The main reason is that contextuality
shows up in many situations in the social sciences (see [6] and references therein).
In particular, well-known examples exist on cognitive sciences, where human
decision making has been show to not follow classical probability theory, in the
sense of being incompatible with a jpd, therefore being contextual. Furthermore,
as mentioned above, the connection between speech and thought is contextual.
In other words, behavioral outcomes are contextual, and ultimately what we
observe is tied, in one way or another, with behavioral outcomes.
It is possible that such contextuality comes from factors unknown to or un-
controllable by the experimenter. For example, in a real-world situation, where
most learning happens, the brain is bombarded with huge amounts of disparate
stimuli, some of them perhaps even seemingly contradictory to each other (e.g.,
simultaneous exposure to stimuli that represent pain and pleasure). Such stim-
uli are not forgotten, insofar as learned unconscious decision processes are con-
cerned, by moving to a new environment in the protected conditions of controlled
experiments. If we now think in terms of brain mechanisms, the presentation of
a stimulus may activate not only neurons associated with this stimulus, but also
other context-relevant neurons that were activated in the learned real-world sit-
uations. Furthermore, because we should expect neural activation to be stronger
to the original stimulus, the detection of such neural patterns would be very dif-
ficult (particularly because we would not know what we should be looking for).
If we could, perhaps, be able to measure all neurons in the brain, we would not
have any implicit contextuality showing up (at least not in the measured firing
patterns), though we could have explicit contextuality; however, as we will see
below, this is very difficult empirically.
To see this, let us examine the well-known case of the “guppy” effect [21,2] in
concept combination. The guppy effect refers to the established fact that when
participants are asked to name objects that belong to the concept “pet” and
objects that belong to “fish,” guppies appear with very low frequency. However,
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when asked to name objects that belong to “pet-fish,” guppies are high up on
the list. What makes this example interesting is not that concept combination
changes the frequency of “guppies,” but instead that it changes such frequencies
in a way that is incompatible with classical probability theory (i.e., with a jpd)
[2]. In other words, concept combination as an internal process in the brain is
contextual.
Now, let us say we try to approach the problem mentioned above, of mea-
suring all the neurons associated to some cognitive process. How would we know
which of the neurons are relevant. For instance, we know that once a concept (say,
“fish”) is presented, there is a spreading activation of neurons that are related to
other concepts (e.g., “flounder,” “cod,” “tuna,” “sushi,” “Easter,” etc). Such web
of activated neurons is strongly present in one context, but is not in another
(such as “guppy”). That means that one would have to know what to look for, at
the level of neurons, even when what we are looking for is not currently active.
In other words, to be able to construct a jpd, if it exists, one would have to mea-
sure everything (including external conditions that might seem irrelevant to the
experimenters under the situation, such as temperature, barometric pressure,
amount of saliva in subject’s mouth, heart beat, etc), since any such variables
could present contextual cues that are necessary for the construction of a jpd.
However, as one could imagine, this would not only pose a huge measurement
problem, from a practical point of view, but would also have so many variables
that would make it impossible to obtain any type of statistical information about
the system of interest, as every experiment would be, in a certain way, unique
in terms of control variables. Of course, even if we maximally specify all those
variables, it is still possible that the system displays explicit contextuality, and
no jpd exists.
To summarize, we have the following empirical difficulty brought about by
contextuality. Since contextuality exists in practice (numerous experiments cor-
roborate this), we do not have a joint probability distribution. The only way to
overcome the problem of contextuality would be to observe everything, clearly a
daunting task. But even in such cases, however, no jpd exists, as we would move
from implicit to explicit contextuality. As we will see below, those issues are a
direct challenge for the current version of Tononi’s IIT.
We now turn to IIT. As discussed above, Tononi’s IIT is one of the most
important theories of consciousness currently proposed [20]. IIT is an attempt
to characterize consciousness both quantitatively and qualitatively, giving it a
precise mathematical formulation. Unlike the traditional approach used in neuro-
science, IIT takes as its starting point the phenomenology of consciousness, and
postulates the properties the physical mechanisms, such as neurons with their
synapses, shall respect so that consciousness can take place. One of goals of IIT
is to quantify in what extent one system has consciousness, that is, what mech-
anisms belonging to that system contribute to the emergence of consciousness,
and how much they contribute to it. The second goal is to build a theoretical
tools able to discriminate the different kinds of consciousness that the system
can display. In other words, define a qualia-space.
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According IIT, a system that is capable of generating consciousness must
have a high capacity to discriminate a large number of different states, which
are related to the amount of information that distinct subsystems may generate.
However, IIT also affirms that the ability to differentiate different states is not
enough for the emergence of consciousness: the system must also be able to
integrate information. This postulate is motivated by the fact that, under non-
pathological conditions, the phenomenological experience does not occur in a
fragmented way, i.e., we do not experience the colors of objects separated from
their shapes.
Using concepts from mathematical information theory, Tononi proposes a
measure of consciousness, Φ. In IIT the integrated information Φ is an informa-
tion measure of the repertoires generated by the whole system, compared to the
repertoires generated by the subsystems. Φ is defined in such a way that one of
its consequences is the possibility of existence of different levels of consciousness.
The set of elements within a system endowed with this property to generate a
local maximum of conceptual information integrated is called complex.
For Tononi, systems that are able to generate consciousness are made of sub-
mechanisms, and those sub-mechanisms can be combined in different ways to
create mechanisms. It is the particular configuration of sub-mechanisms, at a
given moment, that Tononi calls “context.”
Though Tononi clearly sees the relevance of contexts to consciousness, in his
model he makes the following assumption for the outcomes of mechanisms (see
the supplementary methods of [20]):
p
(
ABCt|ABCt−1) = p (At|At−1) p (Bt|Bt−1) p (Ct|Ct−1) . (2)
Tononi’s justification for (2) is that there are “no instantaneous interactions
between mechanisms and causes precede their effects.” It also seems to be an
practical essential assumption to allow for computations in his model.
First, we should point out that the appeal to instantaneous interactions is
misleading. To rule out instantaneous interactions, one would have to assure that
the observations corresponding to, say, At or Bt, were separated by an spacelike
interval (see [3] for a detailed argument in a different context). For example, if At
and Bt were measured for an amount of time δt and were processes situated at
a distance d, then any (non-instantaneous) interaction whose propagation speed
is lower than the speed of light could account for violations of (2) if δt ≥ cd.
Since typical distances within the brain are at the order of 10−1 m, this means
that for processes taking longer than 3 × 109 s, we can always explain them
with non-instantaneous signaling. But most cognitive processes are believed to
take much longer than 108 s. So, for biological processes, it is quite reasonable to
assume that (2) may be violated due to physically plausible interactions between
mechanisms (see [4] for a simple neural oscillator model exhibiting contextuality).
Furthermore, we should point out that (2), as shown by Suppes and Zanotti [24],
implies the existence of a jpd. Therefore, the assumption behind (2) is not, as
Tononi claims, that of no instantaneous interactions: it is, instead, an assumption
about no contextuality!
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To show how contextuality may appear in IIT, let us focus on the mecha-
nisms shown in Figure 1. This system behaves in a very simple way, and it is
(a) C
A B
(b) C
A B
Fig. 1. (a) Contextual system of mechanisms, composed of six sub-mechanisms, A, B,
and C. The sub-mechanisms are such that only pairs are simultaneously observable.
(b) For example, when A is active, so is B, but not C. This is shown in the figure by
the grayed area for the system.
constructed merely to show how contextuality can emerge here. We start with
three mechanisms, A, B, and C, each taking values ±1, which we represent
by the ±1-valued random variables A, B, and C. Let us assume that those
mechanisms are stochastic, but, more importantly, that we can only observe the
following simultaneously: (A,B), (A,C), (B,C), and (A,B,C). If contextuality
is present, it is possible to have pairwise correlations for the situations where
(A,B), (A,C), (B,C) are observed such that (1) is violated. In other words,
any measurements except (A,B,C), give strong negative correlations between
A, B, and C. This mechanism is explicitly contextual, since the marginals from
(A,B,C) cannot match the correlations from the pairwise observations, and it is
also implicitly contextual, since the pairwise correlations lead to no jpd. Now, let
us imagine that, in this case, the mechanism is such that at time t only one of the
pairs (A,B), (A,C), (B,C) is observed, and at time t− 1 the triple mechanism
(A,B,C). It is clear, in this case, that equation (2) cannot hold, since there is
no joint probability distribution.
One might argue that no mechanism is truly contextual, since we could, in
principle, measure all quantities of interest simultaneously. This is not necessarily
true for the following reasons. The first one is that in some cases it is not, in
principle, possible to measure all quantities simultaneously. If, and we are not
making this case here, there are underlying processes in the mechanism that are
quantum, non-commuting observables cannot be simultaneously measurable, and
contextuality may exist. This is what happens with entangled states in quantum
mechanics, as in the famous Bell-EPR setup.
The second reason, which we consider more relevant, is simply empirical. It
may be true that, for a certain system, it is possible in principle to measure all
relevant variables simultaneously. However, for reasons of experimental limita-
tions, it is close to impossible to measure them all. For example, imagine, that
A, B, and C are neural oscillators that are measured with EEG. Because the
activity strength of neural oscillators varies, and because EEGs are not spatially
localized and are noisy, it is possible that under a certain stimulus, the only
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observable neural oscillators are a subset of the relevant oscillators involved in
the mechanism (say, A, and B). This does not necessarily mean that the other
oscillator C has no existing outcomes, but simply that it cannot be measured
under the experimental conditions. As a result, because of contextuality, when
correlations are observed, they are enhanced by the selection of a subset of os-
cillators, and no jpd compatible with the observations will exist, even though
all quantities are in principle well defined simultaneously. This, of course, would
provide an empirical difficulty to guarantee that the system is not contextual.
Finally, the third reason is that, for some contextual systems, the experiment
of measuring the pairs (A,B), (A,C), (B,C) has different marginal expectations
(for correlations) than what you would observe for the triple (A,B,C). In this
case, one could have direct influences from context, as the marginal expectations
change. We emphasize that such direct influences do not imply any non-local
interactions, since, as argued above, their time scales are large compared to the
distance scales. To summarize, we provided here a toy example showing how
context-dependent mechanisms violate (2).
4 Conclusions
IIT is a remarkable theory that opens up the possibility of empirically measuring
consciousness. As such, it has the potential to have a significant impact in the
way we think about consciousness. This explains how IIT has become one of the
main theories in consciousness study.
One of the main ideas in IIT is that consciousness comes from processes that
integrate information. Therefore, to measure consciousness, one needs to be able
to measure the integration of information, and, more basically, information it-
self. The question is how to measure information for contextual systems, in light
of the trilemma we mentioned at the outset. We know, for instance, that Shan-
non’s entropy is not adequate for some contextual systems, and in particular,
we know that for the special type of contextuality constrained by the formalism
of quantum mechanics, the more appropriate measure of information is given by
von Neumann’s entropy. However, a more general way of measuring information
in more general contextual systems, such as those necessary for the description
of consciousness, is yet to be developed.
Until such measures of information in contextual systems are developed, the
use of IIT to measure consciousness needs to be clarified, in particular as to how it
is to be applied to contextual systems, which candidate systems to consciousness
are believe to be.
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